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The analysis of the effects of capital gains taxation requires a careful modelhng both of the 
details of the tax code and the imperfections in the capital market. Under the standard 
assumptions concerning perfect capital markets and under the standard idealizations of the tax 
code, there are several strategies by which rational investors can avoid not only all taxes on 
their capital income, but also all taxes on their wage income; these strategies leave individuals’ 
consumption and bequests in each state of nature and at each date unchanged from what they 
would have been in the absence of taxes. Although certain detailed provisions of the tax code 
may limit the extent to which rational investors can avail themselves of these tax avoidance 
activities, there are ways, in a perfect capital market, by which the effects of these restrictions 
can be ameliorated. Accordingly, any analysis of the effects of capital taxation must focus on 
imperfect capital markets. 
If individuals face limitations on the amounts which they can borrow and/or if there are 
limitations on short sales, then under some circumstances there is a locked-in effect (individuals 
do not sell securities which they would have sold in the absence of taxation); but under other 
circumstances individuals are induced to sell securities that they otherwise would have held, in 
order to take advantage of the asymmetric treatment of short-term losses and long-term gains. A 
policy of realizing gains as soon as they become eligible for long-term treatment dominates the 
policy of postponing the realization of capital gains, provided the gains are not too large. 
A simple general equilibrium model is constructed within which it is shown that the taxation 
of capital gains may increase the volatility of asset prices, and lead individuals not to trade when 
they otherwise would. While the analysis casts doubt on the significance of the welfare losses 
resulting from these exchange inefftciencies, there are circumstances in which the tax leads to 
production inefficiencies, e.g. terminating projects at other than the socially optimal date. 
Finally, we argue that the focus of some recent policy debates on the short-run revenue 
impact of a decrease in the tax rate on capital gains is misplaced: even when the short-run 
revenue impact is positive, consumption may increase (thus exacerbating inflationary pressures) 
and private savings may decrease (thus leading to a lower level of investment in the private 
sector). Moreover, there is some presumption that the long-run revenue impact is negative. 
Our analysis has some important implications for empirical research. In particular, it suggests 
that the impact of the tax is not adequately summarized by a single number, such as the 
‘effective tax rate’ representing the average ratio of tax payments to capital gains. Moreover, the 
impact of the tax cannot be assessed by looking only at reported capital gains and losses. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the economic effects of capital gains taxation. 
The tax on capital gains is one of several taxes imposed on the returns to 
capital. We are concerned with those effects which arise out of the 
distinguishing features of capital gains taxation - in particular, from the 
fact that the tax is levied only upon realization of the gains and that the tax 
imposed is a function of the length of time that the asset has been held and 
the circumstances upon which the gain is realized. 
We began our analysis by asking how would rational investors, facing an 
idealized form of the U.S. capital tax structure, behave in a perfect capital 
market. We obtained a set of results, which were perhaps less surprising to 
those in the investment community than to the evidently poorer academic 
economists who have previously analyzed the effects of capital gains taxation: 
with the U.S. tax structure there are a variety of ways by which (with a 
perfect capital market) a rational investor may avoid not only all taxes on 
capital, but also taxes on labor income as well. Since taxes may be avoided, 
taxes are non-distortionary; and since there are a variety of ways by which 
taxes can be avoided, there is not a single optimal tax reduction investment 
strategy. 
The conclusion that all rational investors can avoid all taxation in a 
perfect capital market has an easily testable implication: the government 
should collect no tax revenues from such individuals. The fact that the 
government does in fact collect a considerable amount of revenue implies 
that either (a) most individuals are not rational, well-informed investors; (b) 
capital markets are not perfect; or (c) in the modeling of the tax structure, I 
have ignored some important details, which limit the extent of applicability 
of the tax-avoidance schemes. There is undoubtedly some truth in each of 
these explanations. I argue, however, that while a number of the detailed 
provisions of the tax code make it more difficult for individuals to engage in 
these tax-avoidance schemes, and impose a slightly higher order of cleverness 
on the would-be tax avoider, the level of sophistication required is still far 
lower than that typically assumed in the modern finance literature. 
Imperfections in the capital market (limitations on individuals’ ability to 
borrow and to sell securities short) are, I suspect, crucial.’ Part II of the 
paper is thus concerned with the implications for investment strategies of 
capital gains taxation in an imperfect capital market, in which investors are 
‘Even then, if all individuals were rational, well-informed investors, I suspect that we should 
observe more extensive use of the tax-avoidance activities than we presently observe. And if 
capital markets were very competitive, with a large number of well-informed brokers providing 
information concerning tax-avoidance activities to potential investors, we would have expected 
that the transactions costs associated with many of these tax-avoidance activities would be much 
lower than they presently are. 
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limited in the amount which they can borrow (and/or sell short) while part 
III discusses the welfare implications of capita1 gains taxation. Part IV 
discusses briefly the macro-economic consequences of changes in the capita1 
gains tax rate. 
PART 1 
2. Tax avoidance in perfect capital markets 
In this section we show that with perfect capital markets, and no restrictions 
on loss offsets or wash sales, there are at least four alternative investment 
strategies, all of which yield equivalent results: the individual is able to avoid 
completely paying any taxes, not only on his investment income, but also on 
his wage income. Consumption of the individual in each state of nature is 
identical to what it would have been in the absence of taxation. All that the 
tax system does ,is to induce a set of essentially meaningless financial 
transactions, but these transactions, though intended to avoid taxes, look 
very much like conventional ‘real transactions’ (of the kind that one would 
observe in the absence of taxation). 
The four strategies entail: 
(1) Postponement of the realization of all long-term gains: the ‘locked-in’ 
strategy. We shall refer to this policy as the policy of postponed realization, 
or the ‘locked-in’ policy. 
(2) Realization of all losses while they are short-term, and of all gains as 
soon as they become eligible for long-term treatment. We shall refer to this 
as the policy of immediate realization. 
(3) Borrowing to purchase assets which are increasing in value; we shall 
refer to this as the indebtedness strategy. 
(4) Buying and selling highly correlated securities, so that at the end of the 
year, one is in a position to realize losses to offset income from other sources. 
In successive years, one engages in similar transactions, to offset both the 
gains realized from previous transactions of this sort and current wage 
income. (This is what straddles on the commodity market are designed to 
do.) We shall refer to this strategy as the loss-roll-over strategy. 
Although, with perfect capital markets, these four strategies are equivalent, 
with imperfect capita1 markets they are not. 
There are three critical properties of perfect capital markets required by 
our analysis. 
(1) There are no restrictions on borrowing; there is a single ‘safe’ rate of 
interest (which is the same for borrowing and lending). 
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(2) There are no restrictions on short sales; and when an individual sells a 
security short, he receives the current value of the security as payment.’ 
(3) There are no transactions costs. 
In addition, we make use in our analysis of six properties of a tax system:3*4 
(i) there is no tax on capital gains realized at death; 
(ii) there are no restrictions on wash sales; 
(iii) there are no restrictions on the ability to use capital losses to offset 
ordinary income; 
(iv) there are no restrictions on interest deductions; 
(v) long capital gains are taxed at lower rates than ordinary income; and 
(vi) long-term capital gains are taxed at lower rates than short-term. 
2.1. The optimality of postponed realization 
We now establish 
Proposition 1. If capital markets are perfect [satisfying conditions (1)43)] and 
the tax system satisfies conditions (i)+iii), then with rational investors 
pursuing an extreme ‘locked-in’ strategy (but hedging the associated risk) the 
tax system leaves unaffected individuals’ consumption and bequests in each state 
of nature and raises no revenue.5 
Assume the individual has taxable wage income at time t of y,. We show 
how with only one risky security the individual may manage his portfolio in 
such a way as to eliminate all tax liabilities. For simplicity, we use discrete 
time, with the period of analysis corresponding to that for the payment of 
taxes (a year). We denote with an asterisk values of variables in the no-tax 
situation, and with a caret the values in the tax avoidance portfolio strategy. 
We assume at the beginning of the period he has outstanding debts of B, 
and outstanding holdings of the risky asset of A,. (If there are many risky 
assets, then A, is to be treated as a vector.) We assume the rate of interest for 
the period is r,, and that all debt is short-term. For simplicity, assume B, = 0, 
A,=O. Assume the individual would have had an optimal investment 
‘Thus, a short sale is just like a loan, except that the amount to be paid back depends on the 
(random) price of the security (at the time the ‘loan’ is repaid). This assumption is made to 
simplify the analysis. It obviously does not provide an accurate description of how short sales 
occur. The implications of this for the conclusions we reach are discussed below. 
‘For a more extensive discussion of the provisions of the U.S. tax code relating to the 
taxation of capital gains, see Stiglitz (1981b) or Minarik (1981). 
‘In addition, we ignore the rules relating to the offsetting of long-term gains with short-term 
losses. But see below. 
51f capital gains are taxed upon death, it is still optimal to postpone them until then. In that 
case, our analysis shows that the old adage, ‘There are two things in life which cannot be 
avoided - death and taxes’ needs to be modified to read ‘You can avoid either taxes or death, 
but not both.’ 
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strategy in the absence of taxation denoted by {A:(&), II:(&)}, where S, 
denotes the ‘state’ of nature at time t (a complete description of the history of 
the economy up to that date). The individual’s consumption profile is thus 
described by 
WJ =Yt -rt l(S, l)V- l(S, - 1) + {Evt) - w- l(S, - 111 
-P,(W4w -A,*_ l(S, - 111, 
where pt is the price of the asset in the tth period. For simplicity, we have 
assumed risky assets pay no dividends6 (The modifications required if firms 
pay dividends are straightforward.) 
Assume that with probability one:’ 
P,(&) #Pi l(St - d for all {St, St - d 
and, for simplicity, that 
min IP,W -pt @, - J( = KL 11 >O. 
Assume in the first period the individual sets 
&SO) = 4WJ +YrlL 
but simultaneously sells short y,/l, units of the asset, so the net position 
remains AX. Then, at the end of the period, the individual will have made a 
loss either on the asset or on the short sales. If p1 >pO, he closes out the 
short sale for a net loss of 
so he will have no tax liability. He then again sells short y,/l, units of the 
asset, so he again carries forward a net position of A,*. 
He then purchases an additional amount 
A*-_A*+?!? 
1 O 1,’ 
‘As 1 pointed out in 1973, it is difftcult to explain why rational tirms pay dividends. The 
subsequent literature trying to explain the ‘dividend paradox’ has left me unconvinced, 
particularly with respect to the tax-avoidance activities of closely held companies. For a further 
discussion, see Stiglitz (1982b). 
‘In continuous time, all we would require is that within the year interval, the probability that 
the movement of price from the original price exceeded 1, in absolute value was unity; this 
would be satisfied with any stochastic process described by a diffusion equation with positive 
variance. 
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selling short an additional amount yJ1, .’ Following the same procedure as 
the previous period, he then more than eliminates all the tax liabilities he has 
accrued in that period. 
The process continues until, at death, all shares are realized. Since all gains 
are assumed to escape taxation upon death, this procedure has enabled the 
individual to avoid completely all income and capital taxation, and to leave 
his consumption and bequests identical to what they would have been (in 
every state of nature) in the absence of taxation. (The procedure we have 
outlined is, of course, not the only procedure that would have worked; in 
particular, it is not the procedure which minimizes the number of 
transactions, since no account is taken of the previous positions taken, and 
the prices at which the securities were purchased at earlier dates.) 
2.2. An alternative procedure for avoiding taxation: The optimality of 
immediate realization 
In this section we show that there is an equally effective way of avoiding 
taxation when there is a differential tax rate on long- and short-term gains 
and losses. We assume the capital market is perfect (in the sense defined 
above); but now, we assume the tax system has the additional critical 
property” that long-term gains are taxed at z times the rate on short-term 
gains. 
Throughout the analysis we assume a ‘flexible’ time period: the individual 
can realize a gain or loss just before or after the end of the period, thus 
recording either a short-term loss or a long-term gain. 
We employ exactly the same model and notation as in the previous 
subsection. We assume that the individual takes precisely the same 
investment decisions as in the previous model at the end of the zeroth 
period. At the end of the first period, if there is a decline in price, the 
individual realizes the loss, just as he did earlier. But now he sells his entire 
‘long’ position. This implies that during the first period the individual will 
have no tax liability, and will have a tax loss carry over of 
(where z is the tax rate). 
‘If AT <AZ, he will need to purchase an additional amount of yz/l, and sell short an 
additional amount of y,/l, + A; ~ A: to attain his desired position. 
“We also assume that long-term gains are not used to offset short-term losses on a one-to-one 
basis. See below. 
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At the beginning of the next period he closes out his short position, 
incurring a long-term tax liability of 
(Po-Pl)z+ 
1 
His net tax liability at that juncture is 
T-h -~c(Po-Pl)c(z-l)Yll~l -‘%I +Yll. 
If z is small, L, will frequently be negative.” 
Similarly, if there is a rise in price he closes out his short position just 
short of a year, eliminating his tax liability and establishing a loss carry 
forward of 
7 (Pl-Po+l i . 1 1 
At the beginning of the next period, he closes out his long position, incurring 
a long-term tax liability of 




Now, his net liability on the capital account is 
L, = (pl-po) (z-l)++zIl; [ ( +y, . 1 > 1 
Again, at the beginning of the period the individual re-establishes his 
position, now setting 
and selling short (y2 + Ll)/12 units of the risky asset. This ensures that at the 
end of the period he will have sufficient losses not only to eliminate any 
outstanding tax liability on capital account, but also to eliminate any tax 
liability on his wage income. 
“We assume long-term gains and losses are taxed at the rate 2r and the resulting tax is 
simply added to the tax liability on short-term gains (losses). 
264 J.E. Stiglifz, Taxation of capital gains 
The procedure continues, until the individual dies, in which case any 
outstanding liabilities are escaped. Note that again, in this procedure, 
consumption in each state is the same as it was without taxation, and the 
individual’s net position in each state was identical to what it would have 
been without taxation. 
We have thus established: 
Proposition 2. With perfect capital markets [satisfying conditions (l)-(3)] and a 
tax system satisfying conditions (i)+iii) and (vi), then, with rational investors, 
realizing all losses as soon as they occur, and all gains as soon as they become 
eligible for long term treatment, accompanied by the appropriate hedging 
strategy, consumption and bequests of the individual in every state of nature 
will be the same as it would be without taxation and the tax system raises no 
revenues. 
2.3. A third procedure for the avoidance qf taxation: The optimality of 
indebtedness 
There is another procedure for the avoi’dance of taxation, if there is an 
asset yielding a sure capital gain at the rate r*, and if interest is deductible. 
The individual simply borrows 
at date t- 1, so that his interest for the tth period is 
Yl rt-l __ =yt. ( > r1 I 
He will thus have no tax liability. With the proceeds, he purchases the asset 
yielding the sure capital gain, postponing the realization of the capital gain 
until death, at which point he repays the debt.‘l Note that if the individual 
uses the asset as a collateral for the loan, the lender incurs no risk in the 
transaction. 
This, again, is only one of several possible ways to avoid taxation. If there 
is favorable treatment of long-term gains, the individual could just as well 
have avoided taxes by realizing his capital gain as soon as it becomes eligible 
“If along the no-tax optimal investment strategy, he would, in some state, have reduced his 
holdings of the risky asset (A,*,, <AT), and if there would, as a result, be a capital gains tax 
liability, the individual must that period borrow an additional amount to offset this tax liability, 
Alternatively, instead of selling some of the risky asset, he sells short an equivalent amount. If 
the sale results in a capital loss, the individual need borrow less. 
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for long-term treatment. Then he will have a tax liability on the gain of 




He then borrows enough to offset this as well as his wage income next 
period. At the tth period, the individual’s indebtedness will be 
Similar results obtain if there is some asset whose minimal return is 
positive. Assume p,/p, 1 > 7 and assume the individual sells an option to buy 
the security at price ypr_ r, at a price ql- r. With the proceeds of this and a 
loan of a dollars, he purchases shares of the security. His net position at the 
end of the period is 
apll(l+~,-~)-/li,~p.~I-(l +r)4 
I 
where p”, is the realization of J+. This is a pure arbitrage operation, provided 
“+4t-l =Pt-l 
and 
Z(1 +r)=yp,. 1. 
Then, if the option can be held long enough to be eligible for long-term 
treatment, the individual can use the deductibility of interest to offset all of 
his tax liabilities. 
We summarize the results of this subsection in: 
Proposition 3~. If there is a perfect capital market [conditions (l))(3) are 
sati.sjied], and the tax system satisfies assumptions (i)+iv) and, in addition, 
there exists an asset yielding a perfectly safe capital gain, then there exists an 
optimal investment strategy with individuals borrowing to invest in the safe 
asset, and postponing the realization of capital gains until death. With this 
investment strategy, consumption and bequests are identical 
be in every state of nature in the absence of taxation, 
collected by the tax.12 
“Again, as in the previous two strategies, there are several ways by 
may be implemented. 
JPE F 
to what they would 
and no revenue is 
which this basic policy 
Proposition 3h. Under the conditions of proposition 3a, if in addition, there is 
,jtirorahle treatment of long-term capital gains [tax condition (v)], then there 
exists an optimal investment strategy with individuals borrowing to invest in the 
sufti asset, and realizing capital gains on the saji? asset as soon as they become 
eligible for long-term treatment, which leaves consumption and bequests 
unchanged and the tax raises no revenue. 
Proposition 3~. Assume the conditions of proposition 3a, except now, assume 
(a) there e.uists no saf; usset, hut there exists u risky asset with u minimul 
positive return: und (b) there exists un options murket jtir the asset (with zero 
transuctions costs), with a maturity of’ one year (so it is eligible for long term 
treatment if held to muturity). Then, there exists un optimul investment strategy 
with individuals borrowing, selling options, und buying the security with minimul 
positive return. This investment strategy leaves consumption und bequests 
unchunged und the tmx raises no revenue. 
2.4. The optimulity o/’ roll-over strategies 
The fourth strategy for avoiding taxation is similar to the second, with one 
major difference. It does not require that there be any advantageous 
treatment of long-term capital gains. All that is required is that gains and 
losses be taxed only upon realization (what we identified as one of the 
distinctive properties of capital gains taxation). 
The individual buys and sells short a sufficient amount of the risky asset, 
so that, with probability one, at the end of the year, he has a loss on one 
side of the transaction large enough to offset his other sources of income, i.e. 
he sets 
At the end of the year, he realizes that part of the transaction on which he 
has made a loss, e.g. if p1 <p,,, he sells the security, recording a loss of 
He thus carries forward into the next tax year a loss of 
(PO-PI -~,)Y,l4~ 
At the beginning of the next period he closes out his position, so that at the 
beginning of the year he has an accrued tax liability of 7y, (where 7 is the 
tax rate). The next year he buys and sells short enough of the security to 




of the asset, while selling short 
(Y1 +YJlL 
so his net speculative position is unchanged. The process repeats itself, so 
that in the tth year, he sets 
1+1 
.uS,) = MS,) + 2 YA + 1 
i=l 
and sells short an amount 
t+1 
iz, Yillt t I 
of the asset. 
This process thus enables him to postpone all of his tax liabilities until 
death. We thus have established. 
Proposition 4. With u per_i&ct capital market [sati?fying properties (1)+3)] 
and u tax system satisfying properties (i)-(G), then the roll-over strategy is 
optimal. Individuuls are able by using this strategy to avoid all taxution, and 
their consumption and bequests in each state of nature is unaffected by the tax. 
3. Avoiding tax restrictions 
In the previous analysis we made two important, and unrealistic, 
assumptions concerning the tax code: we assumed that there were no 
restrictions on wash sales and full loss offsets. In this section v:e show how 
these restrictions rnuJ> be avoided. 
3.1. Perfect capitul murkets with restrictions on wush sales 
In this section we show that the restrictions on wash sales need not be 
binding. It is widely believed that by buying a sufficiently large number of 
randomly chosen securities, one can obtain a portfolio (it is often argued that 
only 25 are in fact required) which is virtually perfectly correlated with the 
market as a whole. This is an implication of both the capital asset pricing 
model and the arbitrage model. If this assumption is not true, then the 
capital markets cannot be perfectly competitive [and the market equilibrium 
will not, in general, be Pareto optimal; see Stiglitz (198la)]. We shall refer to 
a capital market which satisfies, in addition to conditions (l)-(3), condition 
(4) below, a perject competitive cupital market: 
(4) There are at least two assets (or portfolios of assets) with perfectly 
correlated returns. 
We assume that the restrictions on wash sales take the form that the 
individual cannot simultaneously (or within a short time span - here taken 
to be the next period) purchase and sell the sume asset. We focus our 
discussion on proposition 2, where the individual does this to take advantage 
of the favorable treatment of long-term gains. Now instead of selling short 
yi//i units of asset ‘CL, he sells short y,/[, units of asset ‘p’. If p, >pO, at the 
end of the period he realizes the loss on his ‘j7 position, and at the beginning 
of the next period (as soon as the asset becomes eligible for long-term 
treatment) he sells his A$+y,/l, units of ‘Co. He then goes ‘long’ in fi in the 
amount AT+[(yz -tL,)/lz], and ‘short’ in SI, in the amount (Y,+L,)/~~. The 
procedure continues as before; each period the individual ‘reverses’ his 
position. 
More generally, we can establish: 
Proposition 5. With a pet$ect capitul market [satisfying conditions (l))(4)] 
tax restrictions on wush sales need never he binding; any consumption-bequest 
plan which could he uchieved in the absence of’the provisions relating to the tux 
treatment o/’ wush .&es can be uchieved with the wush sale provisions; in 
particular, gains are realized as soon as they become eligible for long-term 
treutment. 
There exist portfolio policies implementing the tax-avoidance strategies 
described by propositions l-4 in which the provisions relating to the tax 
treatment of wash sales are irrelevant.‘” 
3.2. Restrictions on loss oifsets 
In the previous analysis we allowed the individual to use capital losses to 
offset ordinary income. In fact, of course, only $3,000 of capital losses can be 
used within any year to offset ordinary income. If this constraint were an 
important one, we would observe most individuals operating against it. 
“It should be noted that recent legislation attempting to restrict straddles in the commodity 
markets has Included a set of provisions which, if enforced, might restrict the kinds of 
transactions just described. On the other hand, the enforcement would require a complicated 
analysis of the statistical properties of the securities purchased by each individual; if enforced, Its 
effects on the securities market could be profound. 
There are, however, a variety of ways by which the impact of this constraint 
may be reduced. 
The simplest method entails taking advantage of the deductibility of 
interest payments, by borrowing and purchasing a safe asset which yields its 
returns in the form of capital gains. 
Even if there does not exist a perfectly safe asset, the individual can obtain 
equivalent results if there exists a security with a minimal positive capital 
gain, by selling an option on the security, as described in section 2.3. 
Alternatively, the individual can ‘lend’ money to the stock market through 
the options market, attaining a safe return in the form of capital gains. To do 
this, assume the current price of the asset is P,. The individual buys one unit 
of the security, buys a put for qP with a striking price, ps, exceeding the 
current price (so his return next period is max [O,ps-p,,,] and sells an 
option for qO with the same striking price, so his return next period is 
min [O,ps--p,+ ,I. Thus, his net income next period is just ps, and in 
equilibrium 
P,=(l +r*Kp,+q,-d 
where r* is the safe rate of interest. Since his return is perfectly safe, it must 
be equal to the safe rate of interest. 
There are, however, alternative methods which are commonly employed. 
An individual can purchase an asset with borrowed funds for which the 
depreciation allowance exceeds the true economic depreciation. If the 
depreciation allowances plus interest on the loan exceed the flow of quasi- 
rents from the asset, then there will be an ordinary income loss, with a 
subsequent capital gain. 
An individual can sell short a security shortly before a dividend is due. 
Following the payment of the dividend, the price of the security will decline, 
and he will experience a capital gain; this is offset by the dividend payment 
which he must make, but the latter is deductible against ordinary income 
[see Allen (1982)]. 
The 1981 tax law imposed restrictions on several of the devices for 
converting capital losses into ordinary income losses, and thereby evading 
the restrictions on loss offsets. These include taking advantage of the 
provisions related to the tax treatment of Treasury Bills, Cash and Carry 
Transactions, and the tax treatment of traders. 
3.3. Implications of wash sule and loss offsset provisions 
The restrictions on wash sales and loss offsets are particularly important 
for the investment strategy which we have called that of ‘immediate 
realization’. But the restriction on wash sales also has implications for the 
first strategy, that which we have referred to as the ‘postponement strategy’. 
For if individuals are to postpone their tax liability, without at the same time 
increasing their position in the security beyond the desired level, then the 
individual must hedge his position (e.g. by selling the security short). But if 
he does this within a year of purchase, although he may be able to postpone 
the tax, the transaction will not be eligible for long-term treatment. 
If the restrictions imply that the individual cannot use the special 
treatment of capital gains to reduce the tax liability on ordinary income (by 
more than the $3,000 loss offset plus the interest on the amount which the 
individual can borrow), he can still use these provisions to eliminate any tax 
liability on his capital income. 
3.4. Further comments on the implicutions of‘speciul provisions 
There are several’other special provisions of the tax code relating to the 
treatment of capital income which impinge on the individual’s ability to 
implement the tax avoidance strategies described earlier. 
We referred, for instance, to the provisions concerning the treatment of 
short-term capital losses in the presence of long-term capital gains. The 
methods which we described above of converting ordinary income into short- 
term capital gains, to avoid the limitations on the deductibility of losses, may 
be used to vitiate the effects of these provisions as well. 
The provisions restricting the amount of interest which can be deducted 
are relevant for the indebtedness strategy described in proposition 3. 
Empirically, this restriction does not seem to be binding [see Feenberg 
(1981)] which suggests that there are easy ways by which the restriction can 
be avoided, e.g. by taking advantage of the peculiarities in the definition of 
those kinds of investment income which can be used to increase the amount 
of interest which can be deducted and/or that the present tax code provides 
alternative and equally effective ways by which taxes can be avoided (as our 
analysis has already suggested). 
Some of the special provisions of the tax code make tax avoidaace easier. 
For instance, if a bond were sold below par, the increase in the value of the 
bond between the purchase date and the maturity date is not treated as a 
capital gain, but as interest income (closing what would be an obvious tax 
avoidance scheme.) Prior to 1982 for a T year bond, l/T of the capital gain was 
imputed as income to the owner of the bond and l/T was deductible as an 
interest expense by the seller. For simplicity. assume the interest rate is fixed. 
In the absence of taxation, an individual or firm which sold a T period zero 
coupon bond, and used the proceeds to buy a T period coupon bond, 
investing the interest payments at the same safe rate of interest, was able at 
the end of T periods with the proceeds to pay off the holders of the zero 
coupon bonds. He would be indifferent to undertaking the transaction. With 
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taxation, however, there is every year a tax reduction in the amount ofi 
which he can use to offset either ordinary or capital income.15 
Here, as elsewhere, we have ignored the general equilibrium aspects of tax 
avoidance; the arithmetic imputation scheme increases the tax liability of the 
individual purchasing the bond. If there was no tax-exempt institutions or 
individuals facing a zero marginal tax rate, this should be reflected in the 
price which a buyer is willing to pay for such a bond. Provided, however, 
there are tax-exempt institutions, they should be willing to buy the zero 
coupon bonds and sell the coupon bonds; in equilibrium a one dollar T 
period zero coupon bond should sell for e-I’. 
PART I1 
4. Imperfect capital markets 
The analysis of part I made the kinds of ‘perfect market’ assumptions 
conventional in the finance literature, and the simplifications in the tax code 
that we employed in our analysis were again of the kind that are frequently 
found both in textbook expositions and in analytical discussions in the 
public finance literature. Yet the results which emerge were clearly 
unrealistic: individuals do pay taxes, and the taxes surely do affect both the 
real investment decisions and consumption decisions of individuals. 
Thus, an analysis of the impact of the capital gains tax must focus on the 
imperfections of the capital market and on at least some of the detailed 
provisions of the tax code. 
In the previous section we showed how those provisions of the tax code 
which, it is commonly argued, restrict individuals’ abilities to avoid taxes in 
the way that we described in propositions l-4 would not, in a perfectly 
competitive capital market, be binding. More generally, it is our contention 
that even if the detailed provisions of the tax code put some limits on the 
extent to which individuals can avoid taxes, if investors were rational and if 
capital markets were perfect, there would be much more tax avoidance than 
14A zero coupon bond promising to pay $1 in T periods sells for err today: the capital gain 
is 1 -e-‘r and hence the inputed interest is (1 -er”)/T. 
“Similar avoidance schemes can be implemented with uncertain interest rates, but they 
require more complicated portfolio strategies for the individual to be perfectly hedged. Though 
the substitution of exponential for arithmetic imputation schemes eliminates the use of this tax- 
avoidance scheme when interest rates are not variable, when they are, a more complicated tax- 
avoidance arbitrage scheme can be devised. 
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is presently observed. Thus, the remainder of this paper is devoted to the 
analysis of the consequences of capital gains taxation with imperfect capital 
markets. 
Not surprisingly, the consequences depend critically on precisely what 
constraints are binding, e.g. whether there is a borrowing constraint or a 
short sale constraint. Although the four policies we outlined in the previous 
section are all equivalent in a perfect market - they all succeed in 
eliminating all tax liabilities - they involve quite different transactions (and 
transactions costs). For instance, the policy of postponed realization (the 
locked-in strategy) may require large amounts of short sales, and, under 
present institutional arrangements (where a short sale is not just the negative 
of a purchase) this may entail significant amounts of borrowing. Similarly, 
the roll-over strategy requires increasing amounts of short sales over time. 
Borrowing constraints are obviously critical for the third strategy. In 
contrast, borrowing is not so critical for the policy of immediate realization. 
Limitations on loss offsets are, however, critical for this strategy, as well as 
for the policy of postponed realization and the roll-over strategy. In the next 
section we detail the effects of capital gains taxation under a variety of 
imperfect capital market conditions. 
5. The basic intertemporal trade-offs in the timing of capital gains 
The central feature of the capital gains tax upon which we focus is that 
investors can time their realization of gains and losses, and by doing so affect 
their tax liabilities. We shall show that paying careful attention to this aspect 
of investment strategy may, in fact, yield far higher after-tax returns than 
paying a corresponding amount of attention to the choice of alternative 
assets (particularly if one believes in the random walk hypothesis). 
When an individual decides to realize a gain today rather than at some 
later date, he affects not only his tax liability today, but also his tax liability 
at that later date. Thus, the impact of the capital gains tax can only be 
assessed within an intertemporal model. There are three basic effects, which 
we refer to as the rate @x*t, the PDV gjjtict, and the risk ejjd. 
5.1. The rute ej@t 
The timing of the realization of a gain or loss affects the tax rate which is 
imposed:” 
lbThis list is not meant to be exhaustive; for instance, an individual who is planning to give a 
gift next year to a charitable foundation might be better off not realking a capital gain this year, 
but rather giving the security directly to the foundation next year. 
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(i) By postponing realization, a short-term gain may be converted into a 
long-term gain; or conversely. 
(ii) By realizing a loss early, it may be treated as short-term, rather than 
long-term. 
(iii) By postponing realization until death, the capital gains tax may be 
avoided entirely. 
(iv) Consider an asset purchased at t,. Assume that the individual realizes 
a loss at date t,, and reinvests the proceeds in a similar asset. Assume at 
t, an event occurs which necessitates that individual selling his asset. If 
1 +t,<t,< 1 +t,, then this change in value between t, and t, is treated as 
short-term, while if the individual had not realized his loss at t,, it would 
have been treated as long-term. If there is a large gain between t, and t,, the 
individual is worse off; if there is a loss, he is better off. This argument 
assumes an imperfect capital market; as we argue below, if the individual 
could borrow or sell short an essentially equivalent security, then he would 
not need to sell his asset, even if a contingency arose which required the 
expenditure of a significant fraction of his net worth.17 
(v) The realization of a large capital gain in one particular year may result 
(because of the progressivity of the tax structure and the imperfect provisions 
for averaging) in the individual facing a heavier tax liability than if the asset 
were sold gradually over a number of years. At the same time, the ability to 
time the realization of capital gains and losses may enhance the effective 
degree of averaging associated with the income tax structure.i8 
Equally important, if the individual has a realized (short-term or long- 
term) loss exceeding the limitations on loss offsets, then the effective current 
marginal tax rate on any realized gains is zero. 
5.2. The PDV effect 
By postponing the realization of a gain, the present discounted value of the 
tax liability on the gain is reduced (if the rate of interest is positive); 
conversely, by realizing a loss as soon as it occurs, the present discounted 
value of the implicit tax reduction is increased. 
Conversely, if there was no inflation, but the real rate of interest was 
negative, the individual would lower his tax liability by realizing gains as 
soon as they occur and postponing tax losses. Effectively, the government 
borrows money paying a zero rate of interest, while all other borrowers pay 
negative interest rates, and hence the individual prefers to lend to the 
government by realizing only gains and postponing all losses. 
“Restrictions on wash sales may still impede the individual’s ability to realize the gain at 
favorable capital gains rates. 
IsDifferences in tax rates are important in understanding the impact of capital taxes within a 
general equilibrium context. See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). 
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5.3. Risk effects 
The realization of a 
to realize a loss next 
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gain this year may make it possible for the individual 
period which the individual otherwise would not be 
able to realize. Of course, if the individual were sure that the asset were 
going to decrease in value, then he would clearly not keep the asset (in the 
absence of taxation). But if there is some chance that it will decrease in value, 
and if there is differential treatment of long-term gains and short-term losses, 
it may pay the individual to realize the gain today. Assume, for instance, that 
the individual purchased an asset at a price pO, and its present price is pi. 
Assume there is some probability that the price will fall back to PO and some 
probability that it will rise to p2. By realizing the gain today, the individual 
increases his tax liability by zz(p, -pO), where ZT is the tax on long-term 
capital gains. If the price falls to pO his tax liability next period will be 
reduced $pl -po), where r is the tax on short-term capital gains. If the price 
rises, assume he sells the asset at some date f periods later, the same as he 
had planned to do originally. We assume this date is sufficiently far in the 
future that any gain will be eligible for treatment as long-term. His tax 
liability at this date is increased by zz(p, -pO). The change in the expected 
present discounted value of his tax liability is 
G-PO) z- 
i ( 71 +(l-7c)z __ l+r m >1 ’ 
where rc is the probability of the price falling, and Y is the interest rate. Note 
that if r=O, but z< 1, the policy of immediate realization has a lower PDV, 
while if z= 1 and r>O, the policy of postponed realization has a lower PDV. 
The individual is effectively giving money to the government at date t - 1 
for the ‘right’ to obtain money from it at date t, if the price of the security 
goes down. 
This way of putting the problem makes it clear that the right to realize a 
short-term loss and receive an offset against other income is like a put: the 
value of the option increases the lower the price of the security and is greater 
the greater is r. Moreover, the put ‘expires’ in a year. The price paid for the 
option is the increase in tax liability, at date t - I, from realizing the capital 
gain. It is lower the lower is z and higher the higher is the price relative to 
the original purchase price. Finally, since the loss will occur in the future, 
while he has to pay for the right to take the loss today, the value of this 
option depends on the rate of discount. 
This risk effect will play an important role in our subsequent analysis. If 
individuals are risk averse, this effect, arising out of the stochastic nature of 
assets, is even greater. 
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5.4. Risk aversion 
The PDV effect, which we discussed above, reflects the fact that a dollar 
today is not equivalent to a dollar tomorrow. Present dollars are worth more 
than future dollars. In addition, income in some events (states of nature) may 
be worth more than income in other events (states of nature). If there were 
perfect insurance markets, then the individual would have equated the 
marginal utility of income in all states. I9 But there are not perfect insurance 
markets, and hence the marginal utility of income in some states may exceed 
that in others. Thus, let us return to our example of an individual who has 
an asset which has increased in value from pO to pl. There is some chance 
that next year will be a recession, in which case his wage will be lower (but 
not sufficiently lower to reduce his marginal tax bracket). The individual 
would like to insure against this event, but cannot obtain insurance in the 
market. He may, however, be able to obtain some insurance through the tax 
system. Assume that if there is a recession the price will fall back to pO. We 
noted above that by realizing the gain today, he increases his current tax 
liability by zz(p, -pO). But then, if the recession occurs, he will be able to 
reduce his tax liability by t(pl -pO). If the marginal utility of income in the 
recession is sufficiently high, he will be willing to purchase this ‘insurance’, 
even though the expected present discounted value of his tax liabilities is 
thereby increased.“,” 
The mathematical models that we present in the subsequent sections help 
to clarify the nature of the important intertemporal trade-offs that we have 
identified in this section, 
6. Optimal investment strategy for a short-term investor 
In this section we analyze the optimal investment strategy for a short-term 
investor. We assume that he knows that at the end of, say, two periods, he 
will wish to cash in his investments. His objective then is simply to maximize 
the expected value of his terminal wealth at the end of two periods. His 
“More accurately, the individual would have purchased complete insurance for all 
‘individualistic’ events, i.e. all events which the market can diversify out of. 
“This effect may be particularly pronounced if there are both incomplete risk markets and 
imperfect capital markets. If individuals could easily borrow (never faced credit constraints), then 
the individual could ‘smooth’ the loss of income which occurs next period over an extended 
period of time. Thus, the difference in his marginal utility of income might be relatively small. 
However, if there are borrowing constraints, the reduction in income next period may result in a 
marked decrease in consumption and a corresponding increase in the marginal utility of 
(current) income. 
“The ‘price’ the individual pays for this ‘insurance’ depends on the tax structure. If there is no 
favorable treatment of long-term gains, then the price (in terms of the reduction in the expected 
present discounted value of his consumption) is positive, while if there is favorable treatment of 
long-term gains, this strategy may actually increase the expected present discounted value of his 
consumption, as we saw above. 
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initial wealth is W,. The probability distribution of the percentage increase in 
the price of the asset is given by F(p,/p,_ i) and is the same for all t. We 
choose our units so that initially the individual has one unit of wealth, and 
purchases one unit of the asset, with p0 = 1. At the end of the first period the 
asset is worth pi. The individual can either sell his asset, repurchasing an 
identical asset, paying out or receiving from the government a capital gains 
tax (short- or long-term, as the individual times his sales on the 365th or 
366th day); or he can retain his asset. The second period, the individual will 
sell his asset. If he retained his asset in the preceding period, it will be 
subjected to long-term taxation; otherwise, it will be subjected to long-term 
or short-term taxation at the individual’s discretion. Straightforward 
calculations establish that 
Proposition 6. There exists a critical vulue of p1 > 1 denoted by 8, such that 
for p1 <$ the individual sells his asset while for p1 >@ the individual retains his 
asset. 
Further, it can be shown that 
z[y(l-z)+z(l-z)g(l-F(l))] 
j= (1 -zz)(Y-(1 -z)g(l -F(l))) ’ 
where 
F( 1) = fraction of time that a loss occurs, 
g = 7 (p - l)dF/( 1 - F( 1)) = percentage mean value of a gain, 
and 
1 conditional on a gain occurring. 
7 is the average rate of return on the asset. 
From this we can easily calculate the fraction of the time that individuals 
do not turn over their securities at the end of the year, F($). It is clear that ~5 
depends on the following. 
(1) If z= 1, i.e. full taxation of capital gains, then $= 1, the individual 
realizes all losses, but postpones all gains. As z+O, $+co. 
(2) If y=O, the individual realizes all losses as short-term, and all gains as 
soon as they become eligible for long-term treatment. The reason for this is 
that, in this model, funds are reinvested in the same asset. Hence, the effective 
discount rate is zero and there is no advantage to postponing the realization 
of capital gains. 
(3) The larger the mean return, the smaller @, while the larger the expected 
value of the loss, conditional on a loss occurring, the larger fi. Moreover, the 
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smaller z, the larger the advantages to be had from the asymmetric treatment 
of gains and losses, and therefore the larger fi. 
7. Long-term investors 
Similar conditions can be used to show that long-term investors too may 
find it optimal to realize their capital gains as soon as they become eligible 
for long-term treatment. The analysis is, however, considerably more 
complicated. We focus on the case where the stochastic process describing 
the asset’s price is stationary. 22 Assume we buy an asset at p= 1, and let the 
minimum holding period for long-term treatment be one period. (These are 
just normalizations.) There is a constant probability 2 2 0 that the individual 
will have to realize the asset at date t. 23 Then the optimal policy may be 
simply described as follows. 
There is a critical price $(t) such that if p(t)<fi(t) the loss should be 
realized. The costs of realization at date t are (i) there is a chance that in the 
interval (t, 1 + t) there will be a ‘forced’ realization, which will be treated as 
short-term, which, otherwise, would be treated as long-term; and (ii) if fi< 1 
to take advantage of a tax loss at a subsequent date the price must fall still 
further. 
We suggested above that one could think of the right to obtain a tax loss 
as a put, with a fixed termination date of a year. But unlike conventional 
puts, whenever the put is exercised, it is replaced by a new put, somewhat 
less attractive (if fi< 1) in its striking price than the original put but with a 
longer maturity. The benefit (if $< l), is the tax rebate. 
Consider first the case where the probability of a forced realization is zero. 
Clearly, $2 1 for 02 t5 1. For if the price ever returns to its original level, 
the individual can replace the ‘old’ put with a new put, at no cost. The 
return from doing so increases with t. The old put and the new puts are 
identical, at t =O, and hence there is no benetit to replacing one with the 
other. Hence, $(O) = 1. 
This result may be seen in a slightly different way. Assume, at t = 1, i(t) = 1, 
i.e. the investor always retains assets on which he has earned a long-term 
capital gain. Assume the individual will not sell the asset (for consumption 
purposes) for an extended period of time (more than a year). Then, there is a 
finite probability within a year if p is near unity that the price will become 
less than unity (as p approaches unity, this probability increases.) If p does 
become less than unity, there is a finite gain to being in a position to realize 
the loss as a short-term loss. Since as p-+1 the cost of being in this position 
goes to zero, it is clear that @ must exceed one. 
With forced realizations, we need to ask: Would an individual be willing to 
pay a positive price for a contract which gave the individual an additional 
22The assumption of stationarity is important, as the analysis of Stiglitz (1981b) shows, 
Z3Again, we are making use of the assumption of a binding borrowing constraint. 
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amount of z(p, -pJ if pt <pl, but where he would have to pay an additional 
amount of z(p, -p,)(l -z) if pt>pl, if he sells the asset within a year, 
knowing that there is some probability that he will involuntarily have to sell 
the asset during that interval? From what we said above, if the probability is 
zero, the price of this contract is positive; while if the probability is large 
enough, the probability of a gain is significant enough, and z is small enough, 
then the price of this contract is negative. We shall limit ourselves to the case 
where the probability of a forced realization is sufticiently small that the 
price of this contract is positive. 
There is a discontinuity in i at t= 1. Once the asset has become long-term, 
the price paid for realization is much reduced; and given our stationarity 
assumptions, after t = 1 both the benefits and costs remain unchanged. 
Finally, we note the effect of the differential taxes on long-term and short- 
term gains on 8. If long-term and short-term gains are taxed at the same 
rate, 
@=l for all t 
For, assume B(t)> 1. We argued that the only reason that there is an 
advantage to realizing a gain was that it put us in a position to realize a 
short-term loss. Assume that subsequently at f we realized a loss of 0-p”. If 
we had simply waited until p, the PDV of our tax liabilities would have been 
z(p”- l)e-” rather than z[(@- l)e-” +(p”-fi)e-‘r]. Conversely, if j(t) < 1. 
Consider now the other limiting case, where z=O, i.e. there is no long-term 
capital gains tax. Then, just after t- 1 the individual would realize his gain; 
there is no cost to obtaining the ‘put’ and (under our assumptions, if the rate 
of forced realizations is low enough) considerable benefit. It immediately 
follows that, once again, P(t) = 124 for 0 5 t 5 1. 
We can summarize this discussion in: 
Proposition 7. There is II critical j?(t) suck that if p(t) <P(t), the individual sells 
his asset. p satisfies the following properties: 
(a) !W) = 1; 
(b) p(t)20 for t>l; 
(c) limfi(t)~lim@(t)~ 1, 
t91 f\ll 
24Assume i(f) P 1, for some f, O-C f < 1. As before, the only reason to sell is to take advantage 
of the provisions for tax losses, in the interval (f, b+ 1). Our earlier argument established that if 
the date of subsequent realization was within the period (0, l), no advantage was served by the 
earlier realization. On the other hand, if the realization was in the interval (1,1 ff), again no 
advantage is served, since at worst the individual would have, at 1, realized his long-term capital 
gain without paying any taxes. Similar arguments show that 6 cannot be less than 1. 
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lim~(t)=lim~(t)=l for 05ts1, 
lim$(t)=co for t>l, 
Z-t0 
lim$(t)= 1 for t> 1, 
z-1 
dfi 
,<O fort> 1. 
Although in this and the preceding section we have analyzed the optimal 
investment strategy of an investor under rather particular assumptions, 
elsewhere we have explored alternative formulations. The result that, 
provided the capital gain is not too large, it is desirable to realize gains as 
soon as they become eligible for long-term treatment, appears to be 
robust.25-27 
PART III: The welfare analysis of capital gains taxation 
8. Exchange efficiency, production efficiency, and the locked-in effect 
There has been considerable concern over the distortionary effects of 
capital gains taxation, especially over the locked-in effect. The analysis of the 
preceding sections has raised two important points: in a perfect capital 
*‘The analysis of this and the preceding section assumed that the binding constraint imposed 
on the individual is his ability to borrow. He would like to take a greater position in the risky 
asset, but cannot. In Stiglitz (1981b) we consider another polar case: the individual keeps his 
level of holdings of the risky asset fixed. As he realizes his losses, the tax rebates are added to 
consumption; when he realizes a gain, he pays for the taxes by reducing consumption. We 
calculate the expected present discounted value of tax liabilities associated with alternative 
portfolio strategies, and show, once again, that the policy of realizing gains as soon as they 
become eligible for long-term treatment may be the preferable policy. 
%r Stiglitz (1981b) we also consider a discrete time, dynamic programming formulation. 
Note that a risk-averse individual is more likely to take the policy of realizing capital gains as 
soon as they become eligible for long-term treatment than a risk-neutral individual; for such a 
policy yields a positive ‘tax’ return to the individual in precisely those states of nature when the 
value of the security has decreased. Thus, this strategy provides a kind of insurance against 
losses. 
“In our analysis we have ignored transactions costs. For wealthy individuals, transactions 
costs are not significant, relative to the possible gains to be had. For instance, with the present 
tax law, with long-term gains being taxed at 40 percent of short-term gains, a security with a 
two-point distribution {g, -I) with equal probabilities generates an expected tax cash flow of 
&(I - 0.4g) if the individual pursues the policy of always realizing gains. Hence, if g > 1>0.4g it is 
clear that this cash flow can be positive while the expected return to the asset is also positive. 
For high variance securities, this cash flow can exceed any reasonable estimate of transaction 
costs. 
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market, there are no real consequences of capital gains taxation; while in an 
imperfect capital market, there may or may not be a locked-in effect. The 
fact that distortionary effects only occur in markets with some capital market 
imperfection makes any welfare analysis tenuous: we cannot rely on the 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics to say that in the absence of 
taxation, the market equilibrium would have been Pareto optimal [see 
Stiglitz (1981c)l. What is required is a second-best analysis, which would 
take us beyond the scope of this paper. We can, however, attempt to identify 
the kinds of distortions introduced by the capital gains tax, in particular, 
those arising from the locked-in effect, when it occurs. The locked in effect 
has two consequences. 
(a) The economy will no longer have the property of ‘exchange’ ejkiency. 
There are transfers of ownership of assets which could make both parties to 
the transfer better off, which, because of the tax, will not take place. There is 
some question, however, concerning the magnitude of the associated welfare 
loss. In particular, the importance that one ascribes to the locked-in effect on 
the stock market depends on one’s view of the role of the stock market in 
allocating real resources (as opposed to providing a convenient gambling 
casino for wealthy individuals). [See Stiglitz (1982a).] 
(b) The capital gains tax interferes with the ‘productive’ efficiency of the 
economy. There are at least three ways that capital gains taxation may 
interfere with the productive efficiency of the economy. First, there is a 
widespread belief that the locked-in effect gives rise to greater volatility of 
asset prices, and this greater price volatility makes investments in equities 
less attractive. Secondly, in those situations where ownership of assets affects 
the uses to which they are put, the impediments to the transfer of ownership 
of assets to those who can best manage them may result in significant 
productive losses to the economy.28 Thirdly, when the return to an 
investment project is realized in the form of a capital gain, then the date of 
termination of the project affects the present value of the tax liability, and 
hence the project may be terminated at a date different from when it would 
have otherwise have been terminated. 
In the following sections we construct simple models examining some 
aspects of these distortions associated with capital gains taxation. 
9. The locked-in effect and price instability 
In the preceding section we noted that there was a widespread belief that 
because the locked-in effect results in thinner markets, prices are likely to be 
more volatile. To assess this allegation, one needs to construct a general 
18The importance of the relationship between ownership and control has long been 
recognized; see, for example, Knight (1921). It has been stressed in the more recent literature on 
principal-agent relationships. 
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equilibrium model. It is not, for instance, obvious that thinner markets result 
in greater price volatility; the locked-in effect might reduce the supply of 
assets and the demand for it proportionately (owners of firm A are ‘locked 
in’ and so do not offer it for sale; but owners of other firms are also ‘locked 
in’ and so do not offer to buy).2g 
The present section provides the simplest dynamic general equilibrium 
model, which shows that the capital gains tax may indeed result in greater 
price volatility.30 We also show that it may result in exchanges not occurring 
which otherwise would have occurred (but it may not necessarily do so). 
There are two groups in the population, two states of nature, one risky 
security to be traded, and no short sales. In state 0, the dividend is a; in state 
1 it is /?. We let mi and pi denote the after-tax dividends received by group i. 
When the economy is in state 0 the probability that it will be in state 0 next 
period in the judgement of individuals of type i is rrbo; similarly, when it is in 
state 1, the probability that it will be in state 1 next period is rc’;,. The two 
groups may differ in their judgments about the transition probabilities 
(equivalently, since what we will be interested in is the marginal utility of 
income in each state times the probability, that product will differ between 
the two groups even when, with rational expectations, they agree on the 
transition probabilities). 
In each state, the security will be held by the group which values it most 
highly. The valuation of the security depends, of course, on what they believe 
they can sell the security for, if they desired to sell it. For simplicity, we shall 
focus on the case where group A holds the security in state 0, group B holds 
the security in state 1.31 Then: 
v,=6Cn,Ccl,+r/o-zz,(‘V,-T/,)l+(1-x,)CBn+v~ll, (2) 
29These arguments implicitly assume a kind of imperfection in the capital market; gambles on 
the price of a security are not restricted to the number of shares outstanding; and individuals’ 
demands for securities need not be restricted by their reluctance to sell their present holdings, if 
they can borrow against these or sell these (or equivalent) securities short. 
30We suspect that the likelihood that the capital gains tax leads to greater price volatility is 
even greater than our simplified model suggests. Assume, for instance, that there are two groups 
in the population, one of which has volatile beliefs about the return on the risky security, the 
other of which has very stable beliefs. In the absence of capital gains taxation, the stable group 
sells to the volatile group when the latter is optimistic, dampening out the price fluctuations 
from what they would be if only members of the volatile group traded with each other. The 
locked-in effect may remove the stable group from the market (particularly in inflationary 
periods); since those who are very optimistic about the return in some security are willing to sell 
their present assets, and pay a capital gains tax, to buy the security about which they have 
become optimistic, the members of the more volatile group will not be locked in to the same 
extent that members of the stable group are. With only the more volatile individuals remaining 
in the market, the price variability will more fully reflect the volatility of their expectations, 
31The restrictions on the parameters which must be satisfied for this to be a consistent 
solution are set forth in Stiglitz (1981b). 
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where 
v =value of security in state i, 
6 =discount factor, 
Z =ratio of capital gains tax to tax on ordinary income, 
Zi = tax on ordinary income of group i, 
71.4 =n& 1 -?r*-7r~1. 







v, = ““::$gy$ -$ _;_m*))(*)6. 
where 
mA =‘IIA +zzA( 1 -nA), 
m,=7rg(l -zzB). 
We are interested in the effect of taxation on price volatility. Hence, we 
calculate 
vo dA + d[m,dA - mAdB] + G[dB - dA] 
v,= & + &W&a -m,‘bl 
=l+ @A-de)(l-6) 
4 + dC%dA - mAdBl 
(4) 
From this we can easily calculate the effect of any change of taxation on 
price volatility. We examine one special case, leaving other cases to the 
reader. We assume that the probability of a transition from state 0 to 1 is 
equal to the probability of a transition from state 1 to state 0, in the 
judgment of the individual holding the security (which differs in the two 
states). We assume moreover that zA = zB. Hence: 
v, (a-B)(1-6)(nA-n,) 
-=’ +(ann+(1-n,)P+G[P(ap-nA)-zr(l-n,)B+d(71g~~])’ v, 
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From (4) V,/V, >< 1 as (~~--fl)(rc~-~,J PO; hence, an increase in the capital 
gains tax increases volatility. 
We can also use this model to show that the capital gains tax may result 
in exchanges which would have taken place in the absence of capital gains 
taxation not occurring. To see this, we recall that for (I) and (2) to describe 
the equilibrium, the valuation of the risky security in state 0 must be higher 
for group A than for group B. Assume individual B initially owns the shares. 
We can calculate how much he receives, after paying capital gains tax, if he 
sells. (What A will be willing to pay depends, as we have already noted, on 
how much tax A will have to pay when, subsequently, he resells back to B.) 
Similarly, we can calculate how much it is worth to B to retain the asset 
permanently. If the capital gains tax rate is high enough, the latter is greater 
than the former and no transaction occurs. 
There is, as we have noted, some debate about the welfare significance of 
the reduced trading and increased price volatility in the stock market. If the 
stock market is nothing more than a rich man’s gambling casino, then 
perhaps one should not bo too concerned. On the other hand, if ownership 
and control are linked, the locked-in effect may result in the asset being 
owned - and thus controlled - by an individual, when some other 
individual would be able to put the asset to better use. 
10. Real investments and capital gains taxation 
In this section we focus on the reul effects of capital gains taxation:32 the 
impact it has on the kinds of investment projects undertaken. To do this, we 
employ the standard Austrian capital model; in Stiglitz (1981a) I showed that 
(i) there was some tendency for projects to be terminated too early, not too 
late; and (ii) if one could not infer unambiguously from observed average 
returns what the marginal returns were, then there was no method of 
constructive realization which was non-distortionary. 
Here, I wish both to generalize and to qualify this first result: to show that 
there is a general class of problems for which the techniques employed there 
can be used to show that the first result is valid, but, at the same time, that 
there are other important classes of problems for which the ‘conventional’ 
wisdom, that projects will be terminated too late, is true. 
We assume an investment of a dollar yields, after a period of T years, a 
return of f(r). The question posed is: At what date (or for what size ‘tree’) 
32See also Stiglitz (1973) and Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz (1980). In the latter we explore the 
effects of capital gains taxation on a particular class of productive assets - exhaustible natural 
resources. 
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should the project be terminated? While in the portfolio models considered 
in earlier sections, we assumed the (expected) percentage return was constant 
over time (although this was not essential for some of the results), here we 
assume that there is diminishing returns. 
The impact of taxation will be shown to depend on two critical factors: (1) 
whether the project is treated in isolation, or is one of a sequence of related 
projects; e.g. whether when the tree is cut down it will be replaced by 
another tree; and (2) the extent to which the rate of discount (after tax) is 
affected by the capital gains tax (i.e. the extent to which there is effective 
shifting of the capital gains tax). 
10.1 Isolated projects 
The individual seeks to 
max [f(T)(l -r)fz]e-ir- 1, 
where, as before, z= tax rate and r^=after-tax rate of interest. The solution to 
this is 
There are two effects: r^, the after-tax rate of interest, may well be below its 
before tax rate. This leads to T being larger than without taxation. On the 
other hand, clearly 
and this leads to T being smaller than it otherwise would be. If there is no 
change in the before-tax real rate of interest, so 
r^=r(l -f), 
then T is greater than it would be without taxation. On the other hand, if 
there is no change in the after-tax real rate of interest, T is smaller than it 
otherwise would be (a negative locked-in effect). 
10.2 Replacement 
Assume now that there is a fixed piece of land, on which a single tree 
could grow. Again, we ask: What is the optimal size at which to terminate 
J.E. Stiglitz, Taxation qf capital gains 285 
the project (cut the tree down)? We let I/ be the optimal value of the 
sequence of investment projects; because of the time invariance assumption, 
we can write 
so 
vce -“w-m-- l)U -41 I_~-'T 
It is immediate that r only affects the optimal value of T through its effect 
on i. Straightforward differentiation shows that so long as an increase in the 
tax rate reduces the after-tax return, an increase in the tax will result in an 
increase in the cutting size, i.e. trees will be cut down later than they 
otherwise would be. 
10.3. Stochastic growth 
Following our earlier analysis [Stiglitz (1981a)] and using the techniques 
employed in Brock, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1982), we can easily extend this 
analysis to the case of trees with uncertain growth. Under quite general 
conditions, it can be shown that if the stochastic process describing growth is 
stationary, the optimal policy can be expressed in terms of an optimal 
cutting size (termination size for the project, X*). The expected present 
discounted value of the project is thus 
where T is the first time the tree reaches size X. Let H(ZX) be the 
distribution of the first passage time to the size X, and let M(X,r) be the 
moment-generating function of the first passage time: 
Then our maximization problem can be reformulated as: 
maxM(X,?)[X(l-z)+r]-1. 
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~~M,(I-X)Mt~{lX(l-r)+ilM,,+(l -z)M,). 
If r remains unchanged, the tax always reduces the cutting size (as in the 
non-stochastic case), but the magnitude of the change, as well as the 
direction, in the case where r changes, will depend on the nature of the 
stochastic process. 
Finally the same arguments show that with replacement, the firm’s 
maximization problem is 
maxxw--z)_l 
1-M ’ 
where the only effect of z on X is through its effect on r^, just as in the non- 
stochastic case. 
10.4. Other provisions 
The analysis of the preceding subsection ignored the impact of a large 
number of provisions of the tax code, which can significantly affect the 
outcome. For instance, if there is a step up of the basis at death, then an 
individual expecting to die in the near future may postpone the realization of 
a capital gain (cutting down the tree), even when the real rate of return is 
much less than the rate of interest [or even r(1 -z)]. Similarly, for many 
assets the choice of durability is affected not only by the capital gains tax, 
but equally importantly by the relationship between the true economic rate 
of depreciation and the maximum allowable depreciation rate. 
10.5. Production and exchange 
Our earlier analysis should make it evident that, in the case where there is 
no differential treatment between (short-term) gains and (long-term) losses 
and when all individuals are in the same tax bracket, it never pays to 
exchange an asset on which there is a capital gain prior to the termination of 
the project (again assuming a perfect capital market). By the same token, 
when growth is stochastic, it always pays to exchange an asset when its ‘size’ 
is smaller than at the time of purchase.33 
33This plays an important role in oil leasing. When exploration reveals that there is (in an 
expected value sense) less oil than had originally been thought, there is a decrease in the value of 
the lease. In some cases, it may be prolitable simply to terminate the project, to obtain the tax 
write-off, even though in the absence of taxation the project might be continued. 
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When, however, there are individuals at different tax brackets, then there 
will be transfers of ownership prior to the project termination. For instance, 
assume there is some tax-exempt individual, and the solution to (5) ? (the 
date of termination of the project for the taxed individual) is less than T*, 
the solution 
f’( T*) = rf( T*) 
(the termination date without taxes). Then the value of this tree at ? is not 
I’(?), butf(T*)ePrCT*-r)>f(?). 
We commented in our discussion above that there may be an important 
link between production and exchange, when ownership and control are 
linked together, and when there are significant differences in different 
individuals’ ability to manage particular assets. It should be noted that what 
we have referred to as the termination of a project does not necessarily 
correspond to ‘chopping down a tree’. It may, instead, represent a transfer of 
management of the tree. The tree with a new manager is a different project 
(in our terminology) than the tree with the old manager. The social loss then 
in a delay in the termination of a project is simply the difference between 
what the growth would have been, under the new management, and what it 
was under the old; similarly, for an early termination of a project.34 
Not all realizations result in a change in control; an investor may be 
induced by tax considerations to sell some shares at a different date than he 
otherwise would, but so long as the number of shares is small, there need not 
be a change in the management (and hence in the productive uses to which 
the assets are put). In that case, the only inefficiency arising out of the capital 
gains tax is an exchange inefficiency. If the assets which would have 
otherwise been exchanged but are not, are not too dissimilar, the consumer 
surplus lost as a result of this exchange inefficiency may be relatively small, 
even though the amount of trade impeded in the market may be very large.35 
PART IV 
I 1. Macro-economic effects 
11 .I. Revenue ffects 
We showed in our analysis above that there was some possibility that a 
%milar inefftciencies arise in the estate tax, in the presence of an imperfect capital market. 
Estates with large tax liabilities often must sell ongoing establishments to raise the capital to pay 
the tax. Note that if capital markets were perfect, and if the existing management in fact 
represented the best use of the resources, then the individuals could borrow to pay the estate 
duty. 
35The impediment to the sale of shares which results in the original owner owning more 
shares than he otherwise would may, in addition, lead the firm to undertake less risk than it 
otherwise would. 
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lowering of the tax rate on long-term capital gains would lead to increased 
realization of long-term gains. In the very short run, this would increase 
government revenue; in the long run, however, it is likely to decrease 
government revenue for three reasons. 
(1) The individual is choosing to pay a tax today which he would have 
had to pay at some date in the future. The increase in tax revenue is largely 
simply a change in timing. 
(2) If, as we have argued, one of the motivations for the realization of 
long-term gains is for the individual to be in a position to take advantage of 
the ability to write off short-term losses at full rates, then there will be, as a 
result, a negative cash flow from the treasury.36 
(3) The short-run increase in government revenues is partly the effect of 
moving from one steady state to another. Within the new steady state, there 
are three effects that have to be reckoned with: (i) given that the economy is 
growing, a shorter holding period will be associated with more recent 
investments, and therefore with a larger base; (ii) on the other hand, the fact 
that the investments are terminated earlier means that each will have 
experienced a smaller level of capital gains; and (iii) since a lower tax rate is 
imposed, the tax revenues generated will be even smaller. 
To see this heuristically, assume the average tax rate on realizations, when 
the ratio of the tax rate on long-term capital gains to that on ordinary 
income is z, is r(z), with z’>O; when z is lowered, z is lowered, both because 
of the direct effect of the lower z, and the indirect effect of the greater 
opportunity to take advantage of losses. Thus z’z/rt 1. Assume that 
investments are growing at the rate g, and the average capital gain on 
investments (per dollar invested) realized after T years is f(T) - 1. Thus, the 
steady state flow of tax revenue is proportional to 
zeegT(,f(T) - 1). 
Differentiating logarithmically with respect to z, we obtain: 
If, now, we assume that the interest rate is not less than the rate of growth, 
and if lowering the tax rate lowers the holding period, the steady state flow 
of tax revenues is reduced, at least for values of T near zero.37 
36This negative cash flow will not, however, be reflected in the returns recorded on schedule D 
because of the restrictions on the deductibility of losses; it will, however, be reflected in the 
deductions for interest payments and losses on ordinary income. 
“Even if the after-tax rate of interest is less than the rate of growth (as, for instance, Gordon 
has recently argued) the steady state effect may well be negative. 
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This long-run effect is markedly different from the short-run effect. In the 
transition from one steady state, with say T= T,, to another steady state 
with T = T2 (where T is the average holding period), all those assets invested 
in the interval between t - Tl and t - T2 are sold [where t is the date of the 
(unanticipated) tax change], i.e. there is a one time sale proportional to 
e 9Tl _egT2 
g . 
Clearly, if the transition sales occur rapidly enough, there will be a short- 
term increase in tax revenues accompanied by a long-run decrease in tax 
revenues. Offsetting these effects there are positive effects from any increased 
efficiency in the economy (resulting from the reduction in a distortion) and 
from any increased savings.38 
There is, however, no reason to believe that the gdvernment should take 
either the extremely short-sighted view of looking at current tax revenues, or 
the extreme long-run view of looking only at steady state revenues. Indeed, 
in other contexts we have learned that focusing on steady states, ignoring 
transitions, may be extremely misleading. 
A more reasonable view for the government to take is to ask: What is the 
effect of the change in the long-term capital gains tax rate on (a) the present 
discounted value of tax revenues; (b) the current level of consumption; and 
(c) the level of private savings and the pattern of its allocation? 
It is clearly possible that (even apart from the direct effect of the lowering 
of the tax rate) the change in timing may reduce the present discounted value 
of tax revenues. To see this most simply, we return to a modified version of 
the two-period model of section 4, where an individual has experienced a 
capital gain of p1 - 1. The tax rate on capital gains this period is zlz and 
next period it is expected to be zzz, z2 >z,. Consider the individual who is 
indifferent between terminating the project and reinvesting the proceeds in a 
3sIn the discussion so far, we have assumed that the realization of an asset corresponded to 
its termination (the chopping down of a tree). Similar results obtain, however, if a realization 
simply represents a change in ownership. For simplicity, let us assume that all assets grow at the 
market rate of interest r, and all realizations occur after T periods of ownership. At any date, 
then, there are emqT units of assets which are invested T years ago being realized, each of which 
now has increased in size by an amount err- 1. Similarly, there are eCZgT units of assets which 
were invested 2T years ago being realized, each of which now has increased in size to eZrT, etc. 
The total capital gains tax liability is proportional to (provided gzr) 
(e”_~){e-~r+e-~~re’~+e~~8re~‘~,,,)~(e’~-~)--------- 
1 _e”-B’T’ 
For r near g, the derivative of this with respect to T is positive: reducing the holding period will 
reduce the steady state flow of government revenues. On the other hand, for gS>r the derivative 





terminal wealth is 
second) 
J.E. Stiglitz, Taxation qf capital gains 
which will yield a rate of return of g,, so his after-tax 
(where Ti is his tax payment the first period, T, the 
and keeping his funds in the current project, which will, over the next period, 
increase in value at a rate g,, so his after-tax terminal wealth is 
Pi(1 +g,)(l -z2r)+z2r=P1(1 +g,)- ;i;, (7) 
where Fi; is his tax payment. In the first case, the government’s present 
discounted value of revenue is 
while in the second it is 
z2rcP,(l +g,) - 11 =i 
l+r =-- 1 +r’ (9) 
Equating (6) and (7), and simplifying, we obtain that the difference in the 
government revenues is 
Zr”(P1 - l)(r-g,) +Pl(g, -g1) 
l+r 
Hence, provided that the government’s discount rate is not too large, and 
provided the efficiency gains (gZ-g,) are not too large, the earlier realization 
reduces the present discounted value of government revenue. 
If individuals’ discount rates are higher than the government’s, and if the 
present discounted value of tax payments, using the individual’s discount 
rate, is the same for an investment program involving shorter holding period 
as it is for an investment program involving longer holding periods, then the 
present discounted value of the government’s revenue, using the lower, 
government discount rate, is higher with the longer holding period, provided 
the efficiency loss is not too great. 
11.2. Effects on swings 
All of the analysis so far has assumed that when the individual realizes his 
capital gain, he will reinvest his after-tax proceeds in a productive 
investment, and will not use the proceeds to increase his consumption. 
Even if consumption is unaffected, the earlier realization will lead to a 
reduction in the level of private savings, by an amount equal to the tax 
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payment to the government. The usual argument that the ability of 
individuals to postpone their taxes by postponing realization is equivalent to 
a loan from the government, can be looked at in just the opposite way: it is a 
loan specifically directed at productive opportunities within the economy 
(although the critical rate of return on the investment may be below the 
market rate of interest). The increase in government tax revenues can, in this 
view, be thought of as coming directly out of private savings, rather than out 
of consumption. 
This is, of course, only a first-order approximation. We now need to 
enquire whether a lowering of the tax on long-term capital gains, and the 
shortening of the holding period that might result, will lead to an increase in 
consumption, thus further reducing the private savings available for 
investment, or to a decrease in consumption. Not surprisingly, either result is 
possible under not implausible conditions. 
First, consider an individual who is almost indifferent between the two 
strategies, of selling capital gains as soon as they become long-term, and 
realizing only losses; we can view a switch from the second strategy to the 
first as a mean utility-preserving reduction in the (after-tax) riskiness of the 
investment. Such a change can be shown to leave consumption unaffected if 
relative risk aversion is constant and if all income comes from the risky asset; 
if relative risk aversion is decreasing, then consumption will increase. On the 
other hand, if the income from the risky asset is only a fraction of the 
individual’s total income, then even with constant relative risk aversion there 
will be some reduction in consumption. 
If individuals are constrained in their borrowing, there may also be a 
liquidity effect leading individuals to increase their consumption upon the 
sale of their assets [see Stiglitz (1981a)l. 
There is a third effect. If individuals are risk averse, they will not, in 
general, pursue one policy to the exclusion of the other; changing z will affect 
the proportion of one’s capital gains that are realized. Moreover, individuals 
will alter the proportions in which they invest in risky assets versus safe 
assets.3g 
The important conclusion of this section is that changes in capital gains 
tax rates and tax revenues have markedly different effects from those from 
other forms of taxes. The short-run impact is primarily a transitional effect, 
representing the change from one steady state level of holding periods to 
another. This has little to do with the long-run effects, which may well be of 
the opposite sign. More important, whether tax revenues increase or 
decrease, the income effect of a lowering of the tax rate on capital gains is 
“Again, a slight reduction in z, which induces a change to a shorter mean holding period, can 
be thought of as inducing a mean utility-preserving reduction in the riskiness of the risky 
security. It is known that if there is decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk 
aversion, this will lead to a decrease in the value of holdings of the safe asset. 
292 J.E. Stiglitz, Taxation of capital gains 
always positive, leading to an increase in consumption. As usual, the 
substitution effect may offset this. But in addition to these two standard 
effects, we have noted the possible existence of a third - the liquidity effect 
- which, to the extent that holding periods are shortened, may increase 
consumption; and of a fourth effect, the risk effect, which may lead to an 
increase or decrease in consumption depending on the individual’s utility 
function and the share of income arising from returns on the risky asset. 
Equally important, we have argued that to the first order of 
approximation, changes in capital gains tax revenues can be thought of as 
coming directly out of funds available for private investment, rather than out 
of consumption. Just as social security represents an asset, the anticipation of 
which depresses private savings and investment, the existence of the deferred 
tax liabilities associated with longer holding periods represents a liability, 
which increases private savings and investment. 
Within this perspective, it is difficult to know what significance should be 
attached to the admittedly controversial empirical studies of Feldstein et al., 
1980, that lowering the tax on long-term capital gains will increase (in the 
short run) government tax revenue. 
12. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that the analysis of the effects of capital gains 
taxation requires a careful modelling both of the details of the tax code and 
the imperfections in the capital market. Under the standard assumptions 
concerning perfect capital markets and under the standard idealizations of 
the tax code, there are several strategies by which rational investors can 
avoid not only all taxes on their capital income, but also all taxes on their 
wage income; these strategies leave individuals’ consumption and bequests in 
each state of nature and at each date unchanged from what they would have 
been in the absence of taxes. Although certain detailed provisions of the tax 
code may limit the extent to which rational investors can avail themselves of 
these tax-avoidance activities, there are ways, in a perfect capital market, by 
which the effects of these restrictions can be ameliorated. We have contended, 
accordingly, that any analysis of the effects of capital taxation must focus on 
imperfect capital markets. 
If individuals face limitations on the amounts which they can borrow 
and/or if there are limitations on short sales, then we have shown that there 
are circumstances where there is a locked-in effect; but there are other 
circumstances where individuals are induced to sell securities that they 
otherwise would have held, in order to take advantage of the asymmetric 
treatment of short-term losses and long-term gains. A policy of realizing 
gains as soon as they become eligible for long-term treatment (provided the 
gains are not too large) dominates the policy of postponing the realization of 
capital gains. 
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While we have constructed a simple general equilibrium model, within 
which we can confirm the widespread belief that the taxation of capital gains 
may increase the volatility of asset prices, and lead individuals not to trade 
when they otherwise would , we have cast some doubt on the significance of 
the welfare losses resulting from these exchange inefficiencies. At the same 
time, we have seen that there are circumstances in which the tax leads to 
production inefficiencies, e.g. terminating projects at other than the socially 
optimal date. 
Finally, we have argued that the focus of some recent policy debates on 
the short-run revenue impact of a decrease in the tax rate on capital gains is 
misplaced: even when the short-run revenue impact is positive, consumption 
may increase (thus exacerbating inflationary pressures) and private savings 
may decrease (thus leading to a lower level of investment in the private 
sector). Moreover, we have argued that there is some presumption that the 
long-run revenue impact is negative. 
Although our analysis has focused on the central theoretical issues 
involved in capital gains taxation, it has some important implications for 
empirical research. In particular, our analysis suggests that the impact of the 
tax is not adequately summarized by a single number, such as the ‘effective 
tax rate’ representing the average ratio of tax payments to capital gains. 
Moreover, the impact of the tax cannot be assessed by looking only at 
reported capital gains and 
Our analysis also has 
capital gains taxation, but 
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